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Multiculturalism and the Bretton Woods Institutions 
 
Bartram S. Brown∗ 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Multiculturalism has many aspects and broad ramifications. To begin with 
multiculturalism is an empirical and sociological fact. Multiple cultures exist and 
these are superimposed upon multiple national states in ever changing ways. 
These different cultures develop, interact and at times conflict. The 
multiculturalist view is that mutual respect and recognition of these cultures are 
essential if they are to work together in a positive way. This is as true in 
international law and organization as it is in other fields.  
 The implications of multiculturalism for the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the so-called Bretton Woods institutions, 
are of particular interest. The Bank and Fund are both multilateral institutions 
with considerable financial resources as well as unparalleled clout with private 
financial institutions. They differ in that the basic mission of the Bank is to 
provide support to developing countries while the IMF was created to stabilize 
the international monetary system and to monitor the world’s currencies.  
 Both Bank and Fund have enormous power and potential to frustrate, or 
to promote, the realization of the multicultural ideal. They have inevitably 
become frequent targets of criticism from those calling for greater 
multiculturalism in international law and institutions.  
 The Bretton Woods institutions fall short of the multicultural ideal in a 
host of ways. They were originally crafted by a monocultural Anglo-American 
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alliance, and assume liberal economic principles as their basis. This alone makes 
them vulnerable to multicultural critique. Worse yet, even as they pursue a 
liberalizing economic agenda, each operates on the basis of a weighted voting 
system which favors wealthy industrialized countries. Another especially 
outmoded part of the Bretton Woods formula has been the informal agreement 
under which the President of the US always nominates the President of the 
World Bank, while European states have in practice collectively nominated the 
Managing Director of the IMF.  
 US President George W. Bush’s decision to appoint Paul Wolfowitz as 
President of the World Bank was a shameless indulgence in unilateral excess. 
Prior to his appointment Wolfowitz had shown little interest in multilateral 
institutions, and little background in economic development. Instead he was 
identified with the failed unilateralist policy of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. His 
appointment and subsequent fall from grace at the Bank have exposed the 
absurd extent of the Western privilege at the Bank and Fund and underlined the 
need for reforms to limit abuse of that power.  
 This essay argues that, despite their deficiencies, the Bretton Woods 
institutions can play an essential role in promoting multiculturalism, human 
rights and the rule of law, but will be most effective only if they learn to practice 
and respect these same principles in their own decision-making and other 
internal practices. Their credibility and ultimate future success depend on it. If 
the Bretton Woods institutions are to achieve their liberal free-market goals of in 
the future, US and European leaders can no longer claim the exclusive right to 
determine who will lead them.  
 After this introduction, Part II of this paper examines the concepts of 
diversity and of multiculturalism; Part III introduces the Bretton Woods 
Institutions and the related issues of multiculturalism; Part IV considers the 
interplay of law, politics and multiculturalism at the World Bank and IMF; and 
Part V formulates a few brief conclusions.  
 
II.  Multiculturalism and Diversity 
 
Defining multiculturalism can be difficult since the term is used variously to refer 
to diversity as a de facto demographic situation, to the normative ideals said to 
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follow from that situation, or to programmatic policy responses to it. 1 
Multiculturalism gained prominence as a phenomenon at the national level within 
countries with diverse multicultural populations. It has been described as “a 
democratic policy response for coping with cultural and social diversity in 
society”. 2  Faced with the growth of highly diverse immigration within the 
framework of English/French/Native American linguistic and cultural divides, 
the Government of Canada has lead the way. 3  Under the 1988 Canadian 
Multiculturalism Act it is the policy of that Government “to recognize that 
multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage and 
identity” 4 and to “encourage and assist the social, cultural, economic and political 
institutions of Canada to be both respectful and inclusive of Canada’s 
multicultural character”.5  
 The thrust of these policies is to recognize and validate the different 
cultural identities of the groups within Canada. The traditional model of 
                                                           
1  According to a study published by UNESCO “[t]hree interrelated, but nevertheless 
distinctive, referents of ‘multiculturalism’ and its related adjective ‘multicultural’ 
which can be distinguished in public debate and discussion are: the demographic-
descriptive, the ideological-normative and the programmatic-political.” Christine 
Inglis, Multiculturalism: New Policy Responses to Diversity, MOST Policy Papers 
N°4, UNESCO, 1996, at 16. (http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0010/001055/ 
105582e.pdf, viewed June 25, 2007). 
2  Id. at 6  
3  Canadian scholars have likewise lead the way in developing the concept of 
multiculturalism. See, e.g. Charles Taylor, whose ideas are the focus, infra, notes 6 to 
15 and the accompanying text, and Edward McWhinney, who has applied the 
concept to international law in particular in a long series of thoughtful studies. See, 
Edward McWhinney, The World Court and the Contemporary International Law-
Making Process, Sijthoff & Norodhoff (1979); Edward McWhinney, Conflict and 
Compromise, International Law and World Order in a Revolutionary Age, New 
York (1981); Edward McWhinney, Western and Non-Western Legal Cultures and 
the International Court of Justice, in: Festschrift: A Celebration of the Scholarship 
and Teaching of Gray L. Dorsey, 65 Wash. U. L.Q. 873 (1987); and Edward 
McWhinney, Judge Manfred Lachs, and Judicial Law Making, Opinions of the 
International Court of Justice, 1967-1993, Kluwer (1995).  
4  Canada’s policy is that multiculturalism is “an invaluable resource in the shaping of 
Canada’s future.” See, the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S., 1985, c. 24 (4th 
Supp.), [C-18.7], An Act for the preservation and enhancement of multiculturalism in 
Canada, [1988, c. 31, assented to 21st July, 1988], Article 3(b).  
5  Id. Article 3(f). 
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liberalism abhors any such official recognition or distinction.  
 
II.A.  Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: A Critique of Liberalism’s Politics of 
Equal Dignity 
 
Charles Taylor, in his essay on the Politics of Recognition,6 notes that a “politics 
of equal dignity” has emerged in Western thought based in part on the ideas of 
Rousseau and Kant.7 It values the notion of equal treatment for all “based on the 
idea that all humans are equally worthy of respect”,8 and that there are “universal, 
difference blind principles”. 9  Taylor then formulates what is essentially a 
multicultural critique of this classical liberalism. He stresses that a “crucial feature 
of human life is its fundamentally dialogical character”, 10  and argues that 
individuals can only develop and define their identity through dialogue with 
others. 11  From this perspective he concludes that “[t]he supposedly fair and 
difference-blind society is not only inhuman … but also, in a subtle and 
unconscious way, itself quite discriminatory”.12 In his view, recognition is so 
fundamental to identity that nonrecognition or misrecognition of a group can 
inflict serious harm.13  
                                                           
6  Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in Charles Taylor et al, edited and 
introduced by Amy Gutman, Multiculturalism and the “politics of recognition,” 
Princeton University Press (1994) at 25-73 [hereinafter The Politics of Recognition].  
7  Taylor notes that “[t]he politics of equal dignity has emerged in Western civilization 
Western civilization” with the ideas of Rousseau and Kant as early exponents and 
standard bearers. The Politics of Recognition, supra note 6 at 44. 
8  Id. at 41.  
9  Id. at 43.  
10  Id. at at 32.  
11  “We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves and, and hence 
of defining our identity … through interaction with others who matter to us.” The 
Politics of Recognition, supra note 6at 32.  
12  Id. at 43.  
13  “The thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often 
by the misrepresentation of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer 
real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to 
them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. 
Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, 
imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being.” The Politics 
of Recognition, supra note 6 at 25.  
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 Can these two notions, the liberal politics of equal dignity and Taylor’s 
politics of the recognition of difference, be reconciled? Taylor himself does not 
argue for the abandonment of liberalism, but he does endorse the idea of a new 
variant of liberalism more open to different cultural perspectives and to 
collective rights.14  
 Taylor’s critique of liberalism is telling in many respects, but he goes too 
far in predicting that the so-called “rigidities of procedural liberalism may rapidly 
become impractical in tomorrow’s world.”15 Rigidities have a way of becoming 
impractical, but procedural liberalism need not be rigid. When fairly applied to all 
states and parties, and with recognition of cultural differences where appropriate, 
procedural liberalism is the best hope for reconciling multiculturalism with 
respect for the rule of law at the international level. It is important not to throw 
out the baby of procedural liberalism and the rule of law, with the bath water of 
traditional liberalism’s culturally blind and therefore implicitly western-biased 
approach. Of course the rule of law itself must to some extent develop with the 
times.16  
 In any case multiculturalism is much more than a mere critique of 
liberalism. To its adherents it is powerful normative principle in its own right. 
The trend towards greater recognition of multiculturalism’s potential for good 
has been fueled by the development of multicultural values and even of a 
multicultural ideal. Broadly speaking, multiculturalism values the diversity of 
cultures and dialogue between them over more insular, monocultural, western, or 
unilateral attitudes and approaches, and recognizes that internal diversity can 
                                                           
14  “There is a form of the politics respect, as enshrined in a liberalism of rights, that is 
inhospitable to difference, because (a) it insists on uniform application of the rules 
defining these rights, without exception, and (b) it is suspicious of collective goals. … 
Fortunately, however, there are other models of liberal society that take a different 
line on (a) and (b).” The Politics of Recognition, supra note 6, at 61. 
15  Id. at 61.  
16  Edward McWhinney has aptly noted that “the Rule of Law need not be another 
convenient synonym for perpetuating the political-legal status quo of yesterday, and 
… the role of the lawyer and of the judge today consists not merely of mechanically 
restating the old law but also of assuming responsibility for imaginatively up-dating 
or re-writing it to correspond with new societal conditions and demands.” Edward 
McWhinney, Western and Non-Western Legal Cultures, supra note 3, at 873, 878-79 
(1987). 
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impart strength, innovation and growth to a society.17  
 A key rationale for the policy of multiculturalism is recognition of the 
inherent value of dialogue with “the other”. Diversity dialogue can fuel the 
internal development of the state and its economy. Socrates reportedly said that 
“the unexamined life is not worth living” and pursuing this foundational 
“Western” ideal he asked difficult questions about Athenian society for which 
“crime” he was ultimately sentenced to death.18 It is in the spirit of Socrates that 
multiculturalism stresses the value of learning through an inter-cultural 
dialogue.19 The coincidence of different cultures and peoples in one state can 
bring to it more varied insights and capabilities which can be especially valuable 
when dealing with the outside world.  
 
II.B.  Critiques of Multiculturalism  
 
Even some proponents of multiculturalism recognize that it should be 
implemented with caution. Multiculturalism could potentially disadvantage the 
rights of individuals within the minority by reducing them to mere members of a 
recognized group. Respect for difference should not become a license for in-
group subordination.20  
 A more fundamental external critique of multiculturalism challenges the 
very idea of adopting policies based on cultural differences. Some are concerned 
that cultural recognition might come at the expense of other values, such as the 
                                                           
17  Canadian Multiculturalism Act, supra note 4, Article 3(b).  
18  The charge, according to Plato was “[t]hat Socrates is a doer of evil, and corrupter of 
the youth, and he does not believe in the gods of the state, and has other new 
divinities of his own.” See, Plato, Apology, Benjamin Jowett trans. (1942) (The 
Internet Classics Archive, http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/ apology.html (last viewed 
June 28, 2007)). 
19  “A multicultural curriculum works very well in fulfilling the traditional goals of 
education in philosophy. It can assist the teacher as Socratic ‘midwife’ and ‘gadfly’ in 
delivering students of their narrow and uncritical opinions and awakening them to a 
world of intellectual diversity.” Carol J. Nicholson, Three Views of Philosophy and 
Multiculturalism: Searle, Rorty, and Taylor, Encyclopedia of Philosophy of 
Education, http://www.ffst.hr/ENCYCLOPAEDIA/jcarol.htm (last viewed June 
27, 2007). 
20  Ayalet Sachar, Two Critiques of Multiculturalism, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 253, 257 
(2001).  
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neutrality of public institutions, economic redistribution or progress towards 
equality of the sexes.21 As discussed above, multiculturalism would seem at the 
very least to imply some derogation from the principle of equal treatment.  
 A moderate policy of multiculturalism can answer such concerns by 
balancing multiculturalism and equal treatment. The Constitution of Canada 
provides that every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right 
to the equal protection, but also allows for special programs to advance 
disadvantaged minorities22 and therefore Canada must moderate its approach to 
multiculturalism. The Canadian Multiculturalism Act contains multiple 
reaffirmations that citizens in Canada should remain legally equality before the 
law.23 It balances these two interests in calling for Canada “to ensure that all 
individuals receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while 
respecting and valuing their diversity”. 24  
 In general critics of multiculturalism argue that it will cause much greater 
problems than those it is intended to address.25 Some even depict it as a threat to 
freedom, progress, reason and science. 26  In their view the very notion of 
                                                           
21  See, e.g., Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and 
Women’s Rights (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001).  
22  Under the heading of “Equality Rights” Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms states: 
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its 
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
23  Canadian Multiculturalism Act, supra note 4, calls for it “to ensure that all individuals 
receive equal treatment and equal protection under the law, while respecting and 
valuing their diversity.” Articles 3(1)(e). See also Preambular paragraphs 1, 5, 6, and 
7, and Article 3(2)(a).  
24  Canadian Multiculturalism Act, supra note 4, article 3(2)(b) mandates “policies, 
programs and practices that enhance the ability of individuals and communities of all 
origins to contribute to the continuing evolution of Canada”.  
25  See, Ayelet Shachar, Two Critiques of Multiculturalism, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 253, 
(2001) at 257-273.  
26  As the Ayn Rand Institute puts it: 
  Multiculturalism seeks to obliterate the value of a free, industrialized civilization 
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multiculturalism denies the standards of objectivity and truth which are the 
foundation of Western civilization 27  and the widespread acceptance of 
multiculturalism would therefore lead to barbarism.28 One author who does not 
endorse multiculturalism, speaks of objectivity as the search for “the widest 
possible intersubjective agreement”. 29  It is true that at one extreme, the 
assumption that all cultural values are equal could lead to an empty and valueless 
moral and cultural relativism. Multiculturalism recognizes that “all should enjoy 
the presumption that their traditional culture has value” but it does not assume 
that all cultures are of equal value.30  
 
III.  Multiculturalism & the Bretton Woods Institutions 
 
The discussion thus far has focused upon multiculturalism within a national 
society. International society is characterized by greater diversity and cultural 
pluralism than can be found in most national societies. At this level the need for 
multicultural dialogue is compelling, and addressing multiculturalism in 
                                                                                                                                           
(which today exists in the West and elsewhere), by declaring that such a 
civilization is no better than primitive tribalism.  
  We are opposed to this destructive doctrine. We hold that moral judgment 
is essential to life. The ideas and values that animate a particular culture can and 
should be judged objectively. A culture that values freedom, progress, reason 
and science, for instance, is good; one that values oppression, stagnation, 
mysticism, and ignorance is not.”  
 Website of The Ayn Rand Institute: (http:://www.aynrand.org/site/ 
PageServer?pagename=media_topic_multiculturalim), last accessed June 15, 2007.  
27  John Searle, “The Storm over the University,” in Debating P.C. Paul Berman, ed. 
(New York: Dell, 1992) at 112. 
28  Taylor acknowledges that in the view of multiculturalism critic Roger Kimball “[t]he 
multiculturalists notwithstanding, the choice facing us today is not between a 
“repressive” Western culture and a multicultural paradise, but between culture and 
barbarism.” The Politics of Recognition, supra note 6 at 72, citing Roger Kimball, 
Tenured Radicals, New Criterion, January 1991 at 13.  
29  Richard Rorty, Does Academic Freedom Have Philosophical Presuppositions: 
Academic Freedom and the Future of the University, Academe (Nov.-Dec. 1994) at 
52.  
30  “It makes sense as a matter of right that we approach the study of certain cultures 
with a presumption of their value … But it can’t make sense to demand as a matter 
of right that we come up with a final concluding judgment that their value is great, or 
equal to others.” The Politics of Recognition, supra note 6 at 68-70.  
Multiculturalism and the Bretton Woods Institutions     9 
international norms and institutions31 can be an especially difficult and delicate 
challenge.  
 If, as Taylor argues, individuals and groups within the State can only 
develop and define their identity through dialogue with others,32 the same may 
also be true of States which can also learn from and influence each other in a 
global dialogue. This dialogical character is a crucial aspect of each State and of 
each culture’s ability to achieve individuality and is not antithetical to it. What 
then might be the implications for the Bretton Woods institutions of this 
broader global vision of multiculturalism?  
 
III.A. Some Background on Bretton Woods 
 
The Bretton Woods Institutions were a post-World War II Anglo-American 
project. The period between the two World Wars had been plagued by 
protectionist high tariffs, exchange rate manipulations, and other economic 
policies reflecting a narrowly nationalistic and unilateral perspective. These 
policies had contributed to global economic stagnation by choking off 
international trade. Recalling the international economic chaos which had 
preceded the war, the leading economic powers of the time decided to construct 
a postwar system of international economic organizations which would build a 
liberal capitalist economic order.  
 The architects of the Bretton Woods system were influential UK 
economist John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White of the US Treasury. 
They brought their governments into agreement on a shared vision of a liberal 
economic order via more open international trade and a more stable and 
predictable international monetary system. They attempted to embed this liberal 
economic vision into the text of the treaties establishing the IMF and the World 
Bank.  
 These treaties created powerful and well-funded institutions dedicated to 
realizing this vision. Each provided for more wealthy or prosperous members to 
provide the resources which less prosperous and/or developing country 
                                                           
31  As UNESCO notes, “[t]he close parallels between [the] ideological-normative usage 
of multiculturalism and the United Nations’ views on cultural diversity are clear.” 
Christine Inglis, Multiculturalism: New Policy Responses to Diversity, MOST Policy 
Papers N°4, UNESCO, 1996, at 17. 
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members can draw upon, often subject to economic policy conditions. A 
weighted voting system is part of the price of developing countries pay for access 
to resources. Together these resources, and this decision-making system, give the 
Bretton Woods institutions great power over borrower countries.  
 
III.B.  The Roles of the IMF and World Bank 
 
The IMF was intended to be a major pillar of the international economic order, 
maintaining exchange rate stability, helping its members to deal with short-term 
balance of payments disequilibria and, in general, establishing a reliable 
international payments system. The original Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate 
system completely collapsed in 1973, leaving the IMF in search of a new mission. 
In adapting to the developing country debt crisis of the 1980s, the IMF found a 
new niche as the designated advisor to heavily indebted developing countries. On 
the surface, the Fund’s two major activities remain the same: surveillance of 
national economic policies and providing financial support for adjustment 
programs when necessary. Now, however, the Fund’s advice concerns not only 
fiscal policy but also banking, competition policy and a broad range of economic 
policy matters, including governance.33 That advice is supposed to be based on 
the principles of transparency, simplicity, accountability and fairness, which are 
essential aspects of good governance. 34  Until recently, 35  heavily indebted 
countries generally had little choice but to accept the Fund’s austere policy 
directives.  
 Fund surveillance is facilitated by the extensive economic information that 
members are required to divulge to the Fund. Every year or so, pursuant to 
Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF sends a staff team to 
visit each member country to hold bilateral discussions. The team visits the 
country to collect economic and financial information and to discuss with 
national officials the country’s economic developments and policies. After 
                                                                                                                                           
32  The Politics of Recognition, supra note 6 at 32.  
33  Robert Graham, Thirteen Years of Change Take Toll on IMF Chief: The Camdessus 
Years, Financial Times (London) (10 Nov. 1999), 16.  
34  See, The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note (Approved by the 
IMF Executive Board, 25 July 1997), paragraph 13. 
35  See the discussion of Argentina’s alternate approach to getting out of debt, infra. 
notes 68 to 71 and the accompanying text.  
Multiculturalism and the Bretton Woods Institutions     11 
returning to headquarters, the staff prepares a report which is used by the 
Executive Board as the basis of discussion.  
 The basic financial resource of the IMF consists of funds from member 
states, each of which is required to contribute according to a “quota” reflecting 
the size and strength of its economy. Members are entitled to draw freely upon a 
first “reserve tranche” of these resources representing their contribution in gold 
and convertible currencies in excess of this quota. The Fund allows member 
countries to draw upon additional “credit tranches” of its resources only if they 
comply with IMF “conditionality,” making financing available to debtors only if 
they promise to comply with IMF-determined conditions concerning their 
national economic policies and performance. After initial approval, the Fund 
continues to act as a sort of international financial policeman, monitoring 
compliance with the promises it has exacted from debtor countries and giving a 
creditworthiness green light to the international financial community. 36 
Supplementing the basic financial support it makes available to its members, the 
Fund has developed an array of special “facilities” in response to the persistent 
economic problems of debtor countries.  
 In 1945, many countries did not share the enthusiasm of the US and the 
UK for an IMF to support monetary and financial discipline. Creation of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the third pillar 
of international economic cooperation, broadened the appeal of the proposed 
system of international financial institutions by offering something concrete to 
the economically disadvantaged regions of the world. The IBRD was established 
in 1945 to finance the reconstruction of countries devastated by World War II 
and the development of more traditionally impoverished areas of the world. The 
Marshall Plan, introduced in June of 1947, eventually assumed the burden of 
financing reconstruction in Europe leaving the Bank free to devote its resources 
to the development task. Today, the IBRD is the central institution in what is 
known as the World Bank Group.  
 The Bank’s role goes beyond providing development financing, since it 
has always provided borrowers with advice on development as well. Since there 
is a fine line between giving advice on development and giving general advice on 
economic policy, the Bank now shares with the IMF responsibility for inducing 
                                                           
36  For an early analysis, see E. Robichek, The International Monetary Fund: An Arbiter 
in the Debt Restructuring Process, 23 Columbia JTL (1984), 143. 
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debtor countries to make needed macroeconomic reforms.  
 
III.C.  Liberal Aspects of the Bank and Fund 
 
Liberalism is based on the idea that every individual has natural rights including 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.37 As rightly understood, it implies the 
search for success in the form of truth, justice and understanding. At its best, 
liberalism demands that we seek effective, workable solutions for problems that 
are both practically possible in a management sense and consistent with 
fundamental values such as human rights. Most liberal values are known to other 
non-liberal, traditions as well, and indeed within the liberal tradition it is often 
assumed, rightly or wrongly, that its core values are universal.  
 As noted above, the Bank and Fund were created to promote the liberal 
economic goal of economic globalization based on open markets. The Bank and 
Fund, however, are liberal in other ways as well such as in their dedication to 
promoting accountability, transparency, good governance and the rule of law. 
Increasingly, the Bretton Woods institutions are focused on implementing these 
liberal principles.  
 Different aspects of the liberal tradition sometimes seem to conflict, as 
when the World Bank was called upon to deny loans to apartheid regimes by 
incorporating concern for human rights international into its lending decisions. 
Originally, the Bank argued that it could not do so without betraying its duty to 
act impartially and only on the basis of economic considerations rather than 
political ones. Later the Bank developed a more evolved view of its role as 
lender, under which it considers government human rights violations as an 
indicator of economic creditworthiness.  
 There was a parallel development with the consideration by the Bank of 
international environmental performance and standards. At first, the Bank view 
was that environmental considerations were merely a political consideration. 
More recently, the Bank has acknowledged that the adverse environmental 
effects of its lending projects can be understood in economic terms as 
“externalities” which are indeed part of the total cost.  
                                                           
37  This phrase, adapted from John Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, was used 
by Thomas Jefferson in the US Declaration of Independence. See The Declaration 
of Independence, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  
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III.D.  Bretton Woods Voting and Decision-Making Procedures 
 
Voting and decision-making at the Bank and the Fund are organized along 
similar lines. The business of each is conducted by an Executive Board. The 
relative economic strength of the various member countries, and their 
contributions to the organization’s resources, is reflected in the composition and 
voting of that Board. A “weighted voting” system is written into the treaties 
establishing Fund and Bank, ratifying and institutionalizing within them the 
inequality between the economically strong countries and the economically weak 
ones. As a result, the top five members wield 38% of the total voting power in 
the Fund38 and 37% in the World Bank.39 Together, the US and major European 
countries command more than 50% of voting power in each of them. The 
demand for greater equality has led the UN General Assembly to adopt 
resolutions calling for the reform of the decision-making procedures in 
international economic and financial institutions.40 
 Although apparently at odds with notions of “sovereign equality,”41 the 
weighted voting procedure was a practical response to the valid concerns of 
major contributors about how the contributed funds would be used. Weighted 
voting answered these concerns and thereby assured the participation of donor 
countries.  
 Beyond the issue of weighted voting, the management structures of the 
Bretton Woods institutions are a direct affront to multiculturalism in another 
important way. According to an informal tradition, the post of IMF managing 
director is held by a European and the top job of the World Bank by an 
American. In practice these two appointment privileges have not been equally 
                                                           
38  The voting power percentages for each of the top five countries in the IMF is 
presently as follows: United States: 16.79%, Japan: 6.02%, Germany: 5.88%, France: 
4.86%, and United Kingdom: 4.86%. IMF website, http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/sec/memdir/eds.htm, consulted at 11:00 AM CST on June 15, 2007.  
39  The percentages within the World Bank’s principal organ, the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) are currently as follows -- United States: 
16.41%, Japan 7.87%, Germany 4.49%, France 4.31%, United Kingdom: 4.31%.  
40  See, for example, Article 10 of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 
adopted by the UN General Assembly as Resolution 3281 (XXIX) on 12 Dec. 1974. 
41  Article 2 (1) of the UN Charter states that “The Organization is based on the 
principle of sovereign equality of all its Members”. 
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exercised.  
 In 2001 Europe’s first proposed choice for IMF Managing Director was 
rejected, and essentially vetoed, by the US which then agreed to accept Europe’s 
second choice.42 In contrast President George W. Bush’s unilateral appointment 
of Paul Wolfowitz to head the World Bank in 2005 was effectively unilateral. 
Publicly known as a key architect of the disastrous US decision to invade Iraq in 
2003, Wolfowitz was a controversial and divisive figure even within the US. He 
was a hated figure in Europe,43 but at the time of his confirmation European 
leaders unanimously supported his appointment as President of the World 
Bank.44 The US decision to nominate him was therefore accepted without any 
serious external review; as a US appointee his accountability came only after the 
fact when he was found to have violated Bank policies with regard to a staffer 
with whom he had a personal relationship. Once his improprieties were revealed 
he could not benefit from the reservoir of credibility and goodwill that would 
shore up a candidate with true international support.  
 The appointment of Wolfowitz, a polarizing ideological figure with little 
technical expertise in finance or development, as President of the World Bank 
was more likely to weaken the Bank’s effectiveness than to reinforce it.45 Now, 
                                                           
42  The selection process of the IMF Managing Director in 2001 was described as 
follows: “Koehler’s selection as managing director four years ago came after a power 
struggle among rich countries that was widely deplored as epitomizing the arbitrary 
nature of the process. Following the announcement in November 1999 by IMF 
Managing Director Michel Camdessus that he would retire, the German government 
made it clear that the time had come for a German to take the helm after two 
Frenchmen had held the job. Berlin’s first nominee, Caio Koch-Weser, emerged as 
Europe’s choice, but when the US government blocked his selection by the IMF 
board, German officials indignantly insisted on Koehler, then the head of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Rather than risk a breach 
with the Germans, other nations acquiesced.” 
43  According to reports “[n]ews of Mr Wolfowitz’s nomination was received with shock 
and awe by the international community.” Comment & Analysis: World Bank: 
Bush’s elbow, not his ear, The Guardian (London), Final Edition, April 2, 2005, 
Gaurdian Leader Pages, 19.  
44  Richard Bernstein, Is Europe Trying to Restore The Old Trans-Atlantic Club?, The 
New York Times, April 3, 2005, Section 1; Column 1; Foreign Desk; at 13. 
45  The Italian business-oriented Il Sole 24 Ore, predicted that with Wolfowitz as 
president of the bank, ‘‘it will not be easy to ‘sell’ the World Bank as an institution 
that takes care of the poor in the world.’’ As cited in Elaine Sciolino, Europe on 
Wolfowitz as Banker: Once Chilly, Now Tepid, The New York Times, March 31, 
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after Wolfowitz’s reluctant resignation, it is clear that the World Bank’s efforts to 
promote transparency, good governance and the rule of law were undermined 
despite his sincere effort to promote development and his welcome focus on 
fighting against corruption.  
 The UN General Assembly has implored the Bretton Woods institutions 
to reform their decision-making protocols, but to no avail. Now over sixty years 
after the IMF and World Bank were established, it is time to reconsider the basic 
compromise on decision-making. This reform is necessary not only out of 
respect for multiculturalism, but also to promote accountability, practicality, the 
rule of law and the other liberal principles that are the basis of the Bretton 
Woods institutions.  
 The potential incompatibilities of the Bretton Woods institutions with the 
ideals of multiculturalism seem to dwarf those raised by the multicultural critique 
of the liberal state. It is legitimate to ask whether the Bank and Fund are 
fundamentally and irreparably instruments of a “hegemonic international law”46 
and antithetical to the multicultural ideal or at least impervious to it. I do not 
believe that they are.  
 My thesis is that the Bretton Woods institutions have the potential to 
become an arena within which different states, representing to some extent their 
peoples and cultures, “develop their identities together and in relation to each 
other via the same dialogical processes that are, for Taylor, at the very root of 
ethical substance and indispensable for recognition”. 47  Although Western 
engineered and dominated, these institutions can accommodate multiculturalism 
insofar as they and the liberal principles they promote can adapt to remain 
sufficiently relevant to the multicultural psychology and politics of the 21st 
century. There are clearly limits to how far liberal economic principles and 
Bretton Woods institutional structures can adapt, but a more complete 
understanding of them will only emerge gradually, aided by intercultural dialogue.  
 The same Bretton Woods practicality that developed weighted voting as a 
useful solution in the 1940s now requires a technical correction in response to 
the reality of multiculturalism and the power of the multicultural ideal in today’s 
                                                                                                                                           
2005, Section A; Column 3; Foreign Desk; at 12. 
46  See below notes 72 to 81 and the associated text.  
47  Brian Milstein, “On Charles Taylor’s ‘Politics of Recognition.’” Unpublished paper, 
New School for Social Research, New York (accessed on March 15, 2007 at 
16     Bartram S. Brown 
world.  
 
IV.  Law, Politics and Multiculturalism at the Bank and Fund 
 
IV.A.  The Claim of the Bretton Woods Institutions to be Non-Political 
 
Both the Bank and Fund have always laid claim to a neutral, technocratic 
legitimacy. Article IV, section l0 of the World Bank’s founding treaty is entitled 
“Political activity prohibited,” and it sets out a clear rule that the Bank and its 
officers are not to be influenced by “the political character of the member or 
members concerned” and that “only economic considerations shall be relevant to 
their decisions.” 48  This section has been interpreted as a prohibition on the 
politicization of the Bank.  
 The first part of Article IV(10) is clearly designed to protect member 
states from interference in their internal political affairs. The second part49 sets 
out a positive definition of how the Bank, its organs, and its officers are to 
exercise their discretion in decision-making. Both the General Counsel of the 
Bank, and the Bank’s Executive Director’s have endorsed the view that section 
10 “is no more than a reflection of the technical and functional character of the 
Bank as it is established under its articles of agreement.”50 
 The IMF’s charter does not contain language similar to Article IV(l0) of 
                                                                                                                                           
http://magictheatre.panopticweb.com/aesthetics/writings/polth-taylor.html). 
48  Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Article IV(10), reads as follows: 
 The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any 
member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character 
of the member or members concerned. Only economic considerations shall be 
relevant to their decisions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially 
in order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I. 
49  The second clause of that Article’s first sentence mandates that the Bank and its 
officers shall not “be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the 
member or members concerned”. This clause serves a dual purpose, providing some 
protection for the internal affairs of states while also setting out a “functionalist” 
definition of how the Bank is supposed to reach its decisions. 
50  From a letter dated 5 May 1967 from the IBRD General Counsel to the UN 
Secretariat, cited in UNJY (1967), 121.  
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the Bank’s articles,51 but the Fund has nonetheless taken the position that it too 
is prohibited from making decisions based upon political considerations.52 In the 
Fund’s official view, “[d]omestic policies are ‘social’ or ‘political’ if they do not 
fall within the scope of the purposes of the Fund as set forth in Article I, and the 
Fund may not base its decisions on political considerations of this character”. 53 
Thus a political activity prohibition such as that explicitly set out in the Bank’s 
charter technically applies to the Fund as well.  
 Although in principle both the Bank and Fund are to act solely on the 
basis of economic considerations, in practice this is more easily said than done. 
Both now consider the quality of a state’s “governance” based on the argument 
that bad governance is economically relevant to lending decisions. This is not an 
exact science, however and even the Fund has conceded that “in practice there is 
seldom a clear separation between such economic and noneconomic aspects”.54  
 This especially troublesome from a multicultural perspective because, in 
case of disagreement, the matter is resolved under the weighted voting system. 
The wealthy donor countries determine what is to be considered a technical 
economic matter and therefore relevant to the activities of these powerful 
organizations versus what is political and therefore in principle irrelevant. The 
injustice of this system threatens to undermine the credibility of the Bretton 
Woods institutions.  
 
IV.B.  Past Attempts at Politicization of the World Bank 
 
The weighted voting systems of the IMF and World Bank are especially 
susceptible to politicization inasmuch as they concentrate so much influence in 
the hands of the US and a few allies. In a separate work the present author has 
                                                           
51  See Y. Yokota, Nonpolitical Character of the World Bank, Japanese Annual of 
International Law (1976), 45 (“For the Americans who [at Bretton Woods] held a 
view that economics cannot be separated from politics, it was perhaps easier to 
accept a non-political Bank than a non-political Fund”). 
52  See J. Gold, Political Considerations are Prohibited by Articles of Agreement when 
the Fund Considers Requests for Use of Resources, 12 IMF Survey (No. 10, 23 May 
1983), 146. 
53  Gold, n. 52 above, 146.  
54  The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note (Approved by the IMF 
Executive Board, July 25, 1997), para. 22.  
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developed a legal approach to the issue of politicization in the law and practice of 
the World Bank.55 International organizations such as the Bank and Fund are 
established based on an agreement between their members to work to achieve 
common goals. A negotiated consensus on these goals, and on a set of rules and 
principles for achieving them, is then incorporated into a constitutive document 
in the form of a binding treaty.56 The use of such an organization’s formal 
mechanisms for purposes other than those within the agreed consensus may 
violate its founding treaty and constitute an illegal act of politicization.57  
 Although every loan the Bank makes must be presented to the Executive 
Directors and formally approved by them, the decision on each proposal is 
actually made by consensus before it is formally presented. Any loan presented to 
the Executive Directors for a vote will normally be approved, and details of these 
loans are published by the Bank. The Bank publishes no statistics, however, 
about the loans which are discussed by the Executive Directors but not formally 
presented or approved. Without more information about these behind-the-
scenes discussions, it is impossible to do a systematic and comprehensive study 
of politicization in the Bank’s decision-making.  
 The US Congress has often passed legislation requiring the US-appointed 
Executive Director not to support any proposed World Bank loans to a certain 
country,58 and often the rationale has been more political than economic. These 
Congressionally-mandated no votes have generally proved to be ineffective as a 
way to influence the Bank’s lending decisions59 largely because the US does not 
have enough voting power in the Bank to block loans without the votes of other 
countries. In some cases, however, US politicization of the Bank may have been 
                                                           
55 See Bartram S. Brown, The United States and the Politicization of the World Bank: 
Issues of International Law and Policy (1992) at 234-253. 
56  Id. at 17. 
57  Id. at 27.  
58  See, for example the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act of 2001. 
Act Dec. 21, 2001, P.L. 107-99, 115 Stat. 962, 22 USC § 2151, Sec. 4(c), requiring the 
US Executive Director to oppose or vote against proposed World Bank loans to 
Zimbabwe.  
59  Two decades ago a survey of public records concluded that from October 1, 1979 to 
September 30, 1987, the US voted no 33 times and abstained 69 times on World 
Bank loans which were proposed to the Board of Executive Directors and that, 
astoundingly, every one of these 102 loan proposals was nonetheless approved by 
the Bank’s Board. See, Brown supra note 55, at 253-255.  
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effective in punishing the intended target.60 Even when unsuccessful, US efforts 
to politicize the Bank have undermined its reputation as a fair and non-political 
institution.  
 
IV.C. The IMF Role in the Asian Financial Crisis 
 
Beyond concerns about the fairness of decision-making procedures, the 
politicization of the Bretton Woods institutions, or the subjectivity of the 
economic issue versus political issue distinction, the Fund in particular has in 
recent years lost credibility as a competent economic advisor. The IMF’s 
credibility problems began with the Asian Financial crisis of the 1990s but the 
Fund’s greatest embarrassment came in its relations with Argentina subsequent 
to 2001.  
 In 1997 a devastating financial crisis hit Thailand and spread quickly 
within the region to the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea, and 
ultimately affected economies around the world. When the crisis began, the Fund 
formulated new programs for Thailand, Indonesia, and other affected Asian 
states, and these programs have been criticized for contributing to the panic in 
several ways. The IMF ordered sudden bank closures and, when these were 
implemented without a more comprehensive plan for financial sector reform, the 
effect was to deepen the panic.61 The Fund also contributed to the severe credit 
crunch by pushing banks to recapitalize within an unrealistic time frame and by 
recommending contractionary fiscal and monetary policies.62 Much of this advice 
was similar to past IMF prescriptions for debtor countries in the throes of 
overspending and inflation. Many doubt that this advice was an appropriate 
response to problems largely attributable to the volatility of private capital 
flows.63 In any case, the IMF’s lending rose to record levels during the crisis.64  
                                                           
60  The denial of Bank loans to Czechoslovakia in the Bank’s early years, and to Chile 
Between 1970 and 1973 when socialist Salvador Allende was in power are two 
examples. See, Brown supra note 55, at 132-135 and 164-178.  
61  See IMF Now Admits Tactics in Indonesia Deepened Crisis, NY Times (14 Jan. 
1998) at 1.  
62  Summary of a July 1996 IMF Board discussion on Thailand, in Steven Radelet and 
Jeffrey Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis (30 Mar. 1998) at 24-30.  
63  See Paula Hawkins, International Misery Fund, The European (5 Oct. 1998), Section: 
Finance. 
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 The IMF has not publicly acknowledged making errors during the crisis, 
much less contributing to it. But there are reports that a confidential IMF review 
concluded that the Fund’s policy on bank closures did indeed exacerbate the 
crisis. 65  Despite the IMF’s lack of official public contrition, several of its 
Directors have acknowledged that mistakes were made. The Fund reports 
without elaboration that some Directors expressed concern that Fund policies 
had liberalized capital movements before appropriate regulatory regimes were in 
place66 or that the IMF had overreacted by loading the first stage of its programs 
with too many structural reforms.67  
 
IV.D. Argentina’s Challenge to the IMF 
 
In 2001 Argentina was insolvent and had defaulted on its foreign debt. This is 
the typical situation in which a debtor country must turn to the IMF as the 
lender of last resort. The IMF can offer such a country a number of things, 
including financial resources to meet some of their immediate debts, advice on 
economic policy, and official IMF endorsement of their economic recovery plan. 
The IMF imprimatur is particularly valuable as it gives the green light to additional 
help from governments and private capital markets who rely on the IMF to act 
as de facto international financial policeman. But in order to receive it the 
borrower must sign a “letter of intent” signifying its agreement to implement the 
IMF’s policy prescriptions.  
 Rather than accept the austerity and economic belt-tightening required by 
the IMF’s draconian policy prescriptions, Argentina took another, more radical, 
approach. In 2005, after years of tension with creditors, Argentina bypassed the 
IMF in successfully renegotiating a 70% reduction of the bulk of its remaining 
foreign private debt.68 Argentina’s President Nestor Kirchner has boasted that it 
                                                                                                                                           
64  The total credits drawn from the IMF accounts during the years 1997/1998 reached 
a total of $75.4 billion, $20.1 billion more than the previous year. IMF Annual 
Report 1998, 13 (Overview—Asian Financial Crisis Propels IMF Activity to New 
Levels in 1997/98). 
65  See IMF Now Admits Tactics in Indonesia Deepened Crisis, supra note 61 at 1.  
66  See IMF Annual Report 1999, 36. 
67  Id.  
68  Larry Rohter, Argentina Announces Deal on Its Debt Default, The New York 
Times, March 4, 2005, Section C; Column 5; Business/Financial Desk; International 
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was “the best debt renegotiation in history,”69 and it was all completed without 
the support of the IMF. In another damaging blow to the IMF’s credibility, in 
2006 Argentina finished paying back in full that country’s $US 10 Billion debt to 
the Fund.  
 Argentina still has substantial debt but has comfortable fiscal and current 
account surpluses adequate to deal with them. It has recently been attempting to 
normalize its relations with the Paris Club of officials from the world’s richest 
countries. In the meantime Argentina has learned that, even without IMF or 
Paris Club support, it can still access international capital markets through local 
bond issues in Buenos Aires and bonds issued directly to Venezuelan banks 
eager to invest that country’s oil surplus.70  
 This experience, however difficult it might be to replicate,71 has proven 
that an indebted state need not always accept the policy prescriptions of the IMF. 
The Fund’s failure to acknowledge and address this new reality has undermined 
the credibility of the traditional Bretton Woods prescriptions.  
 
IV.E. Can the Bretton Woods Institutions Adapt? 
 
The World Bank has already demonstrated the capacity to adapt. In 1960 the 
Bank accepted the need to mitigate the severity of market based approaches 
when it created a new affiliate, the International Development Association or 
IDA. The IDA provides loans on concessional terms (i.e. charging no interest 
and with repayment terms up to 50 years) for the most impoverished borrower 
countries who are not eligible for its more market-based commercial financing. 
More recently the Bank has made important progress in incorporating human 
                                                                                                                                           
Business; at 3. 
69  Barrie McKenna, Argentina’s joke on IMF has a bond issue punchline, The Globe 
and Mail (Canada), May 10, 2005, Section: Report on Business Column; World; at 
B13.  
70  Benedict Mander, Argentina tries making peace Buenos Aires is offering to tackle its 
defaulted debt in a bid to boost foreign investment, Financial Times (London, 
England), December 15, 2006, Section: Capital Markets And Commodities; at 39.  
71  Argentine relied on financial assistance from Venezuela which, under the leadership 
of IMF critic President Hugo Chavez, has invested oil revenue in US $billions worth 
of otherwise difficult to market Argentine bonds. The unusually favorable market 
conditions may also have played a role. Future debtors may not benefit from these 
favorable circumstances.  
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rights and environmental concerns into its decision-making.  
 In contrast, the IMF has done relatively little to adapt to changing 
circumstances, although it has made some effort. In 1999 the IMF’s Executive 
Board authorized gold sales by the IMF to generate the equivalent of about US$3 
billion to help finance the IMF’s contribution to debt relief and financial support 
for the world’s poorest nations. Since the Fund, unlike the bank, is not a 
development institution, this policy takes the Fund beyond its original mission.  
 
IV.F. The Choice: Multiculturalism or Hegemonic International Law? 
 
China is rising fast, but the US is still the predominant military and economic 
power in the world today. There is concern about this fact even among US 
allies.72 One danger is that international law and multilateral institutions could 
become just another tool used by the hegemonic power to enforce its 
dominance.  
 Detlev Vagts, noting that the United States is increasingly referred to “as 
the hegemonic (or indispensable, dominant, or preeminent power), 73  has 
suggested that a distorted hegemonic international law74 might result from this 
                                                           
72  Former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine once described the United States 
as a ‘‘hyperpower . . . a country that is dominant or predominant in all categories.’’ 
He suggested that this domination could best be resisted “[t]hrough steady and 
persevering work in favor of real multilateralism against unilateralism, for balanced 
multipolarism against unipolarism, for cultural diversity against uniformity.” Quoted 
in, To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a ‘Hyperpower’, International Herald Tribune, 
February 5, 1999 at 5.  
73 Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 Am. J. Int’l. L. 843, 843 (2001). 
74 Jose E. Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 Am. J. Int’l L. 873, 873 
(2003): 
 HIL jettisons or severely undervalues the formal and de facto equality of states, 
replacing pacts between equals grounded in reciprocity, with patron-client 
relationships in which clients pledge loyalty to the hegemon in exchange for 
security or economic sustenance. The hegemon promotes, by word and deed, 
new rules of law, both treaty based and customary. It is generally averse to 
limiting its scope of action via treaty; avoids being constrained by those treaties 
to which it has adhered; and disregards, when inconvenient, customary 
international law, confident that its breach will be hailed as a new rule. 
Substantively, HIL is characterized by indeterminate rules—whose vagueness 
benefits primarily (if not solely) the hegemon—recurrent projections of military 
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dominance. As he describes it, hegemonic international law downplays the idea 
of the equality of states.75 Instead, the hegemonic power uses ambiguous or 
indeterminate treaty language to claim greater freedom to impose its own 
preferred interpretation of applicable rules. 76  In particular, Hegemonic 
International Law is characterized by the hegemon’s circumvention of the basic 
rule against military intervention in the internal affairs of other states.77  
 Vagts has questioned whether the US has the political and psychological 
infrastructure to act as a true hegemon. 78  Jose Alvarez has discussed the 
possibility of “hegemonic capture of the Security Council” 79 but what about the 
Hegemonic capture of the World Bank and IMF? Even with only 28% of the 
total voting power, the US has more control over the Bank and Fund than it 
does over the UN Security Council where decisions are subject to veto by Russia, 
China, France or even the UK. Those who believe that international law is not 
really law80 or who believe that the US should be unapologetic about using its 
                                                                                                                                           
force, and interventions in the internal affairs of other nations. 
75  See Vagts, supra note 73 at 845 (“The received body of international law is based on 
the idea of the equality of states . . . . To get to HIL, one must discard or seriously 
modify this principle.”). 
76 See Vagts, supra note 73 at 846. 
77 See Vagts, supra note 73 at 845 (“A shift to HIL most specially requires setting aside 
the norm of nonintervention into the internal affairs of states.”). 
78  See Vagts, supra note 73 at 844-45 (according to Vagts, doubts remain about the US 
as hegemon: 
 The terrible blows of September 11, 2001, raise the question whether the United 
States can or will act as a hegemon in a drastic way, that is, in Krauthammer’s 
terms, whether it can carry out “unapologetic and implacable demonstrations of 
will.” . . . Nor does the United States have the political and psychological 
infrastructure hegemony calls for. Thus, the jury is still out on whether we will 
be a hegemon . . . .) 
79 See Alvarez, supra note 138 at 873-74 (arguing that “despite that body’s refusal to 
give explicit approval to Operation Iraqi Freedom in advance, worries about the 
hegemonic capture of the Security Council (along with other forms of global HIL) 
should not be relegated to science fiction. At the same time, it should be understood 
that global HIL, like other forms of hegemony, is a Janus-faced phenomenon, 
capable of winning praise or condemnation from all points on the political 
spectrum”). 
80  See, John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs? 10 Transnat’l L. 
& Contemp. Probs. 1, 48 (2000). 
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singular power to reshape international norms81 would presumably welcome the 
extension of US hegemony through the decisions of the Bretton Woods 
institutions.  
 But from a multicultural perspective, hegemonic international law is 
completely unacceptable. The hegemony of any one country or cultural group 
denies recognition to others and is therefore incompatible with the values of 
multiculturalism. If the perception persists that the Bank and/or Fund are 
instruments of hegemonic international law, the ultimate cost, potentially to be 
borne by the US as by others is that this will reduce and perhaps destroy the 
future utility of these institutions to states and to the international community as 
a whole. 
 
V. Conclusions  
 
V.A. Politicization and Consensus 
 
The utility and continued viability of the Bretton Woods institutions depends 
upon three different types of consensus. First, there is the political consensus on the 
goals to be achieved. The consensus goal of the Fund is to promote international 
monetary stability and that of the Bank is to promote international economic 
development. For the most part these political goals are not in question.  
 Also essential, although more elusive, is a technical consensus on the best and 
most appropriate means to achieve those objectives. Within the Bretton Woods 
organizations, the technical consensus has always been dominated by economists. 
Following the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and Argentina’s apparently 
successful debt restructuring on its own terms, the IMF technical consensus is 
now very much in question. Even if fundamental changes are to be made, parts 
of the Bretton Woods technical consensus will need to be preserved. As the 
Bank and Fund incorporate lessons from multicultural dialogue and experience 
they will need to maintain a pragmatic, functional methodology.  
                                                           
81  Charles Krauthammer, The Bush Doctrine in American foreign policy, A New 
Motto: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, TIME, Mar. 5, 2001 at 42. “America is no mere 
international citizen. It is the dominant power in the world, more dominant than any 
since Rome. Accordingly, America is in a position to reshape norms, alter 
expectations and create new realities. How? By unapologetic and implacable 
demonstrations of will.” 
Multiculturalism and the Bretton Woods Institutions     25 
 Lastly, effective international economic cooperation depends upon a 
normative consensus which cannot be built or maintained without a foundation in 
multiculturalism. The requirement of opinion juris in the development of rules of 
customary international law means that new rules must be supported by a broad 
multilateral, and therefore multicultural, consensus. Any new rules for the 
Bretton Woods institutions must also be built on that basis.  
 
V.B. The Bretton Woods Institutions Must Adapt 
 
After their recent embarrassments both the World Bank and the IMF should 
recognize as never before the value of and need for a multicultural perspective. 
The ill-fated appointment of Paul Wolfowitz as President of the World Bank has 
exposed the US Government’s abuse of its dominance within that institution. 
There will no doubt be consequences. In the future any US nominee for World 
Bank President will draw much greater scrutiny from the international 
community, which is only appropriate for such a key international post. 
Meanwhile the IMF’s prescriptions for economic adjustment have lost their 
luster, and accepting the Fund’s advice is no longer the only option for 
internationally indebted states. The Fund now needs to make adjustments of its 
own.  
 The IMF and World Bank have not always advanced multicultural 
identities, interests and values, but those institutions can still provide a way 
forward consistent with multiculturalism. In fact, they may be needed more than 
ever in the future. Only certain policies and principles often associated with 
liberalism can reconcile the multicultural perspective with both human rights and 
the practical legal framework essential to the rule of law. International financial 
institutions can preserve the best of liberal tradition by incorporating the 
multicultural perspective into that tradition.  
 To remain relevant and effective, the Bretton Woods Institutions must 
avoid two opposing ideological extremes. On the one hand, would be the 
ethnocentric notion that the Bretton Woods institutions, and the Western 
powers who fashioned them, can have nothing to learn from the rest of the 
world.82 For obvious reasons this attitude is seen as both arrogant and insulting 
                                                           
82  US Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, in the course of a dissenting opinion by 
that august body, wrote that the majority’s citation of foreign law was not only 
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by much of the world. The peril at the other extreme is of a crude cultural 
relativism which could undercut achievements in the development of 
internationally recognized human rights standards since the 1940s.  
 
V.C. A Human Rights Perspective 
 
Multiculturalism should not be confused with ethical relativism. The notion that 
all cultural conceptions, values, and principles are relative is extreme, and clearly 
incompatible with internationally recognized human rights. An openness to 
different cultural perspectives is generally a good thing, but it cannot justify 
violations of human rights or any other norms of jus cogens.  
 Western governments, and the US Government in particular, have often 
been tempted to take a narrowly liberal approach to human rights and economic 
development. The Anglo-American liberal perspective tends to prioritize civil 
and political rights over economic, social and cultural rights.83 But the Bretton 
Woods institutions cannot thrive by stressing civil and political rights and free 
market economic principles to the complete detriment of economic, social and 
cultural rights. One important lesson learned in inter-cultural dialogue is that 
maintaining and advancing the international consensus on human rights requires 
a holistic approach. 84  Only within the framework of interdependent and 
indivisible human rights can both multiculturalism and the liberal goals of the 
Bank and Fund be fully realized.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
“meaningless dicta,” but also “dangerous” since as he put it “this Court ... should not 
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans.” Lawrence v. Texas 539 U.S. 
558, 598 (2003). Cf. also, Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural 
Diversity and Political Theory (2000), describing the position of so-called “moral 
monists” at 16, 216, and 149.  
83  “Those who take the view that individual rights must always come first, and, along 
with nondiscrimination provisions, must take precedence over collective goals, are 
often speaking from a liberal perspective that has become more and more 
widespread in the Anglo-American world. Its source is, of course, the United States, 
and it has recently been elaborated and defended by some of the best philosophical 
and legal minds in that society including John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Bruce 
Ackerman, and others.” The Politics of Recognition, supra note 6 at 56.  
84  See, the Vienna Declaration, World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, 14 - 25 
June 1993, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I) at 20 (1993) at para. 5, noting that 
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V.D. Liberalism’s Capacity to Adapt to Multiculturalism  
 
Despite the apparent contradiction between liberalism’s politics of equal dignity 
and multiculturalism’s politics of the recognition of difference, the two are not 
antithetical. Far from being an unchanging set of dogma, the liberal tradition has 
long appreciated the need for dialectic advancement and development. 
Multiculturalism flows logically from liberalism’s norms of equal dignity85 and in 
the past few decades multiculturalism has become an important current in 
contemporary liberal thought.  
 Marx predicted that capitalism would inevitably lead to revolution and 
communism. For the most part this did not happen, in part because liberalism, 
which borrowed and incorporated elements of capitalism, also helped that 
capitalism to develop into something more durable, viable and more potentially 
useful and of universal value. Liberal state trade unions, among other 
innovations, have helped mitigate the extremes of laissez-faire capitalism. 
Comparable adaptations are now needed if the productive potential of the liberal 
economic order is to be preserved in a multicultural world. Neither the pace of 
that reform nor its ultimate success, can be reliably predicted at this time, but this 
goal can be accomplished if supported by enlightened leadership from a 
multicultural alliance including liberal states.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
“[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated”. 
85  The Politics of Recognition, supra note 6 at 68.  
